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Executive Summary
Who bears the corporate income tax? Theanswer to this question is im-
portant to our understanding of the distribution of tax burdens, butit
has been elusive. Although the tax accounts fora small share of federal
revenues, changes in the corporate income tax and its associatedreve-
nues have often been a significant part of revenue legislation. More-
over, because its incidence is often perceived to fall on the affluent,
assignment of the corporate tax burden can havea significant impact
on the assessed progressivity of the tax system as a whole.
This paper reviews what we know from economic theoryand evi-
dence about the burden of the corporate income tax. While theultimate
incidence of the tax remains somewhat unresolved, there have been
many advances over the years in our thinking about how to assign the
corporate tax burden. Among the lessons from the recent literatureare
the following:
For a variety of reasons, shareholdersmay bear a certain portion of
the corporate tax burden. In the short run, theymay be unable to shift
taxes on corporate capital. Even in the long run, theymay be unable to
shift taxes attributable to a discounton "old" capital, taxes on rents, or
taxes that simply reduce the advantages of corporate ownership. Thus,
the distribution of share ownership remains empirically quiterelevant
to corporate tax incidence analysis, though attributing ownershipis it-
self a challenging exercise.
One-dimensional incidence analysisdistributing thecorporate tax
burden over a representative cross-section of the populationcanbe
relatively uninformative about who bears thecorporate tax burden be-
cause it misses the element of timing.2 Auerbach
3. It is more meaningful to analyze theincidence of corporate tax
changes than that of the corporate tax in itsentirety because different
components of the tax have differentincidence, and incidence relates
to the path of the economy over time,not just in a single year.
1.Introduction
Who bears the corporate income tax? The answer tothis question is
important to our understanding of thedistribution of tax burdens, but
it has been elusive. In his classic seriesof analyses of the incidence of
the U.S. tax system, Pechman (e.g., 1985)provided alternative scenar-
ios with different assumptions about theincidence of the corporate
tax, reflecting his uncertainty aboutwhich assumption was best. (He
did not do this for the individual incometax.) Distributional analyses
provided by U.S. government agencies have, on mostoccasions, sim-
ply ignored the corporate tax.Thus, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which
was estimated to reduceindividual income taxes and increase corpo-
rate income taxes, could ifiogicallybe characterized as being revenue-
neutral while providing a tax cut for each incomeclass of a nine-class
breakdown.1
This episode ifiustrates why it is important tounderstand the inci-
dence of the corporate tax. Although the tax accountsfor a small share
of federal revenues, changes in the corporateincome tax and its associ-
ated revenues have often been a significant partof revenue legislation.
Moreover, because its incidence is oftenperceived to fall on the afflu-
ent, assignment of the corporate taxburden can have a significant im-
pact on the assessed progressivity ofthe tax system as a whole.
The most evident difficulty in assigning the corporatetax burden
is that, unlike most taxes, there is no guidancegiven by statutory inci-
dence. While we may start with a workingassumption that individual
income taxes or sales taxes are borne bythe people who are legally lia-
ble for them, for example, there is nocomparable assumption for the
corporation income tax, given the cardinal ruleof incidence analysis
that only individuals can bear the burden oftaxation and that all tax
burdens should be traced back to individualsThus, we must rely on
deeper assumptions from the start, andwith corporations increasingly
becoming multinational enterprises, the individuals atrisk of bearing
the U.S. corporate tax burden clearly includethose beyond our own
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This paper reviews what we know from economic theory and evi-
dence about the burden of the corporate income tax. While the ultimate
incidence of the tax remains somewhat i.mresolved, there have been
many advances over the years in our thinking about how to assign the
corporate tax burden; we don't have all the answers, but we do have
a much better idea where to look for them. I begin with some basic
facts about the corporate income tax, and then move to the evolution
of thought about its burden, starting from a fairly simple approach
based on the ownership of corporate shares. After considering Har-
berger's (1962) landmark contribution, I then discuss a variety of
important issues absent from that analysis, including dynamics, invest-
ment incentives, corporate financial policy, risk, imperfect competition,
the choice of organizational form, international capital flows, and man-
agerial incentives. My focus is on the federal corporate income tax.
States, too, impose corporate income taxes, but the incidence of these
taxes is also influenced by additional factors, notably the degree of
capital mobility across state boundaries and the formulas states use to
apportion income according to the location of sales, assets, and em-
ployment, so that tracing the incidence would lead me too far astray
from my main task.2
2.Corporate Taxation in the United States
The U.S. corporate income tax, in fiscal year 2004, accounted for 10
percent of federal revenues, or 1.6 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP). Figure 1.1 provides these two measures annually since 1962.
From the figure, it is obvious that corporate revenues have declined
over time as a share of revenues and of GDP. The ratios move closely
together, consistent with the fact that revenues have been relatively
stable as a share of GDP. The corporate tax today is far less important
than in the 1960s, when it regularly accounted for more than 20 percent
of revenue. Very recently, there has been concern that corporations
have used increasingly aggressive strategies to limit tax liabifities.
While these concerns may be valid, they are not responsible for the
sharp decline in the importance of the corporate tax shown in figure
1.1. Discounting year-to-year movements and cyclical fluctuations in
this volatile stream of revenue induced by the volatility of corporate
profits themselves, there is little trend over the past two decades. Look-
ing back over the decline that occurred between the 1960s and the
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Figure 1.1
U.S. Federal Corporate Income Taxes, 1962-2004.
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
changes in tax policy but found other factors, such as changes in corpo-
rate financial policy, to be important as well.
Corporations vary enormously in size. While most corporations are
relatively small, the preponderance of corporate income tax revenue
comes from large corporations. In 2001, forexample, 0.04 percent of all
corporations, those with assets above $2.5 billion, accounted for 62 per-
cent of all corporate income taxes (Treubert 2004, Table 1).
Simple economic theories tend to distinguish between corporate and
non-corporate enterprises, but there are many entity types with hybrid
characteristics. Perhaps most relevant to the current discussion are
S corporations, which share many of the legal attributes of traditional
C corporations3 (perhaps the most important being limited liability)
but have their income taxed directly to individual owners, as is
the case for non-corporate ownership structures. When thinking of the
incidence of the corporate tax, we treat S corporations as part of the
non-corporate sector, although the abffity of an entity to choose be-
tween C- and S-corporation forms has clear implications for the in-
cidence of additional taxes on C corporations. The importance of S
corporation status has grown steadily over the years. As of 1986, about
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share had risen to more than half (Luttrell 2005, Figure A).4 In 2001, S
corporations accounted for almost a quarter of before-tax corporate
profits (Treubert 2004, Figure B).
For various types of business, including sole proprietorships and
partnerships as well as S corporations, income from the business is
assigned to the business's individual owners and then aggregated
with the other incomes of these owners and subject to the individual
income tax. The incomes of C corporations, by contrast, are subject to
a distinct tax on corporate income that treats the corporation as an en-
tity subject to taxation. Shareholder income from C corporations in the
form of dividends and capital gains is then subject to additional taxa-
tion under the individual income tax.
3.An Initial Approach to Corporate Tax Incidence
Perhaps the simplest and oldest theory of corporate tax incidence is that
the tax falls on corporate shareholders in proportion to theirowner-
ship. This theory may be implicit in the minds of those who view the
corporate tax as very progressive, for individual share ownership is
highly concentrated among higher income individuals In 2001, forex-
ample, 90 percent of families in the top income decile held stock (either
directly, or indirectly through mutual funds or retirement accounts),
with a median value among those holding stock of $248,000. For the
population as a whole, 52 percent held stock, with a median holding
of just $34,000 (Aizcorbe et al. 2003, Table 6), and with the fraction
holding stock rising steadily with income.
But even this simple method of assigning the burden of thecorpo-
rate tax is not so simply applied. First, a corporation may have both
preferred and common shares, and more than one class of common
shares; each category of shares may confer different rights to thecorpo-
ration's income. If an increase in the rate of corporate taxation reduces
a corporation's after-tax income, it is not always clear how much of this
reduction wifi be borne by different categories of shareholders. Indeed,
this ambiguity is one of the reasons why S-corporation status is avail-
able only for corporations with one class of sharesto assign income
to shareholders we must have a clearly defined way of doing so.
Second, even where the assignment of income is clear, not all share-
holders are individuals Table 1.1 provides a breakdown of the owner-
ship of U.S. corporate equity at the end of 2004. Households owned
less than half of all equity directly, with substantial fractions held by6 Auerbach
Table 1.1





Private pension funds (DB)b 720
Private pension funds (DC)b 971
State and local government retirement funds 1,202
Federal government retirement funds 99
Bank personal trusts and estates 221
Life insurance companies 1,065
Savings institutions 28
State and local governments 89
Rest of the worldc 467
Market value of domestic corporations 14,198
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005), Table L.213.Amounts
net out inter-corporate holdings.
a Holdings of households and nonprofit organizations are grouped together for 2004;
breakdown is based on assumption that proportion held by nonprofits is the same as in
2000, using Table L.100.a.
bDetail from Tables L.119.b and L.119.c.
cRest of world equals holdings of U.S. issues by foreign residents less holdings of foreign
issues by U.S. residents.
various institutions and financial intermediaries. Ownershipthrough
mutual funds, the second-largest ownership category, is not a major is-
sue because tax provisions allow thepass-through of income directly
to individual owners of mutual fund shares. But theother major class
of institutional owners, nonprofit institutions and retirement funds,
poses a more difficult problem.5
Among pension funds, we may distinguish one category, defined-
contribution plans and other tax-sheltered vehicles, for which the
accounts are owned by beneficiaries. For these accounts, it isnatural to
treat the individual beneficiaries as the ultimate ownersof shares held
in the funds. But for the remaining assets, held in the fundsof defined-
benefit plans, the assignment of ownership is less obvious. For private-
sector defined-benefit plans, the first thought mightbe to assign the
assets in these funds to the corporations that maintainthem (and hence
ultimately to the shareholders of those corporations) because the cor-
porations are using the pension funds to meet pension liabffities.
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According to this line of reasoning, any fluctuations in the fund bal-
ances attributable to changes in corporate income taxation wifi require
offsetting contributions by the corporations; hence, the shareholders of
these corporations bear the burden of these changes. But this reasoning
breaks down if pension liabffities are responsive to the health of the
pension fund, either because of influences on the relative bargain-
ing power of employers and employees or because of the abifity of
employers to "put" pension liabffities to the Public Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) at a cost lower than the actuarial pension liabil-
ity.6 In this case, a portion of the pension fund really "belongs"to
employees,7 but the breakdown between employers and employees
is an empirical issue on which there is little evidence. A similar ambi-
guity arises with respect to public-sector defined-benefit plans, with
taxpayers assuming the role taken by shareholders in the case of
private-sector plans.
For the remaining tax-exempt entitiesnonprofit institutions such
as universities and foundationsthere are no owners to which inci-
dence can be assigned. Presumably, the incidence of corporate taxes
that reduce the income of such entities is borne in some measure by
beneficiaries (through reduced services); donors (through increased
contributions); employees (through reduced compensation); and per-
haps others with more indirect connections, such as vendors. As with
the division of "ownership" for defined-benefit pension plans, how the
burden of reduced non-profit funds would be borne is an issue on
which there is little evidence.
Another category of shareholders not represented in table 1.1 (be-
cause their holdings are netted out) is corporations themselves. The
assignment issue is not a problem; if corporation A owns shares in
corporation B, then the portion of corporation B's corporate tax we al-
locate to corporation A can be attributed back to corporation A's share-
holders. But the tax burden wifi be different because of the additional
level of corporate ownership. Corporations receive a deduction from
taxable income of only 70 percent of dividends received, meaning that
such dividends face an effective tax rate of 10.5 percent (30 percent of
the current corporate tax rate of 35 percent); there is no deduction for
inter-corporate capital gains. Thus, the corporate tax burden on share-
holders' income increases as that income passes through additional
corporations.
It would be an interesting exercise to confront each of the assign-
ment problems just discussed and trace all corporate income taxes back8 Auerbach
to individual taxpayers, to determine the incidence patternimplied by
the "simple" approach of assigning corporate taxes to shareholders.
That this has not been done probably reflects both the difficulty of the
exercise and the fact that the shareholder-incidence method has been
perceived to have little theoretical credibility. But as discussed below,
incidence has a dynamic dimension that is often ignored. Even if share-
holders eventually shift some, most, or even the entire corporate tax
burden to others, this shifting need not occur immediately. To the ex-
tent that adjustment takes time, some of the corporate tax mayindeed
be borne by shareholders, and so the exercise just outlined would re-
main useful. Indeed, other considerations discussed below indicatethat
shareholders may be unable to shift the tax even in the long run.
Once we move beyond the assignment of the corporate tax burden
based on information about direct or indirect corporate ownership, an
economic model is needed. Only with such a model can we estimate
how the corporate tax affects the real incomes of different groups in
the population through its impact on factor returns and productprices.
In one of the most influential papers ever written in the fieldof public
finance, Harberger (1962) followed this strategy, analyzing the inci-
dence of the corporation income tax using a two-sector general equilib-
rium model. Harberger's contribution has had a lasting impact on
incidence analysis and provides a useful benchmark against which to
compare subsequent developments in the literature.
4.The Harberger Model
Grouping all production in the U.S. economy into two sectorsaccord-
ing to whether production was predominantly carried out by corporate
or non-corporate businesses, Harbergercharacterized the corporate tax
as an additional tax levied on capital incomeoriginating in the corpo-
rate sector, layered on top of the individual income taxcollected on
capital income from both sectors. He then estimated incidence through
the changes in factor prices and product prices that would resultfrom
a small increase in the corporate tax.
Harberger's main conclusion is probably the most familiar aspect
of the paper. In particular, under reasonable assumptions regarding
the two sectors' production elasticities of substitution and consumers'
elasticity of substitution between the two sectors' products, Harberger
showed that the corporate income tax was borne fully by owners of
capital, economy-wide. This finding has two important elements. First,Who Bears the Corporate Tax? 9
capital bears the entire tax; it is not shifted to labor or consumers, the
other potential victims in the model. Second, it is all capital, not just
corporate capital, that bears the tax. Thus, if corporate capital accounts
for 25 percent of the economy's capital, its individual owners wifi bear
25 percent of corporate taxes; the other 75 percent wifi be shifted to
owners of non-corporate capital. Intuitively, the lower after-tax return
that would be available in the corporate sector because of the higher
tax burden drives capital into the non-corporate sector, pushing down
the available non-corporate return and allowing the corporate return to
recover. In equilibrium, the after-tax returns in the two sectors must be
equal, and Harberger estimates that this new equffibrium level of after-
tax returns will be lower by just the amount consistent with capital
bearing the entire corporate tax.
Harberger's conclusion, which probably remains the most com-
monly held view on corporate tax incidence, indicated that the cor-
porate tax was less progressive than under the shareholder-incidence
assumption because shareholders as a group (at least in 1962, when
pension funds accounted for a much smaller ownership share) were
more affluent than owners of capital as a whole, a large share of which
is owner-occupied housing. But aggregate capital ownership is more
concentrated among higher-income individuals than consumption or
labor income, and so the corporate income tax could still be seen as
contributing to tax progressivity. Another message of Harberger's
work, though, was that the corporate income tax distorted the alloca-
tion of capital between corporate and non-corporate uses in a way that
an overall capital income tax did not. If the incidence of the two taxes
were the same, then the only "contribution" of the corporate tax was
gratuitous deadweight loss. Indeed, the subsequent optimal taxation
literature supported the notion that taxes that distort production deci-
sions are to be eschewed when sufficient other tax instruments are
available (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971). Thus, Harberger's analysis has
also lent support to the view that corporate tax is not a necessary or de-
sirable component of an efficient, progressive tax system.
Harberger's analysis spawned a vast literature over several years
that extended and challenged his initial results. The simplicity of
Harberger's techniquecomparative static analysis of small changes
in a two-sector modelproved not to be a major source of con-
cern given that similar findings resulted from analysis using a multi-
sector computable general equilibrium model (Shoven 1976). But
Harberger's analysis also relied on several more important simplifying10 Auerbach
assumptions. Two assumptions already mentioned are that (1) the cor-
porate tax can be viewed as an add-on tax on capital income originat-
ing in the corporate sector, and (2) production in a particular sector
must be exclusively either corporate or non-corporate. Other key
assumptions include: (1) free mobifity of factors across sectors; (2) fixed
economy-wide factor supplies; (3) competitive markets and constant
returns to scale, implying that all corporate profits representnormal
returns to capital; (4) a closed economy; (5) no risk; and (6) no differen-
ces in spending patterns among individuals andbetween individuals
and government. All of these assumptions have been examined in the
literature.
5.Dynamics
Even if the Harberger model paints an accurate picture of the long-
run effects of the corporate tax, few would argue that theseeffects are
observed immediately. Labor, and especially capital, cannot freely shift
from one sector of production to another. While computers can be
moved from one office to another, it is considerably more difficult to
turn a nuclear power plant into a tractor. Thus, it is probably more rea-
sonable to think of the shifts predicted by the Harberger model as
occurring over time, with some capital moving right away and other
capital shifting more gradually, for example, as capital in the corporate
sector wears out and is replaced by different types of capital in the
non-corporate sector. It is tempting to view this as simply a transition
phenomenon, i.e., that the incidence is temporarily at variance with
Harberger's predictions but consistent with them in the long run. But
the period of transition may be long, and its influence on incidence is
immediate and quite important.
Figure 1.2 ifiustrates the impact of gradual adjustment of capital to an
increase in the corporate tax, under the assumptions that the economy
is in long-run equffibrium at date 0 and there is an unexpected intro-
duction of a corporate tax at date 1. Initially, the economy-wide rate of
return, both before-tax and after-tax, is r0. At date 1, the tax is imposed
after capital allocation has been fixed, so there can be no change in the
before-tax returns in either sectoras capital is in fixed supply in the
corporate sector, it must absorb the entire tax through a lower after-tax
return. Over time, as capital shifts from the corporate sector to the non-
corporate sector, the before-tax return in the corporate sector rises and









returns in the corporate and non-corporate sectors,Tnetandrespec-
tively, gradually coming together at a new equilibrium value of r2.
According to Harberger's analysis, the economy-wide decline in the
net return to capital from r0 to r2, multiplied by the capital stock, wifi
roughly equal the tax revenue collected in the long run.
What is the incidence of the corporate tax in this instance? In
terms of returns to capital, the impact is felt initially by corporate capi-
tal and then spreads to all capital. But in terms of capital owners, the
answer is quite different with respect to timing. The distinction is due
to capitalizationthe reflection in asset values of anticipated differences
in returns to capital. While capital and the returns to capital adjust
slowly, asset values and asset returns adjust instantaneously. Because
investors wifi demand the same after-tax rate of return on corporate
and non-corporate assets, corporate assets must drop in value, relative
to non-corporate assets, by an amount roughly equal in present value
to the gap between the returnsandmet.Thereafter, investors in cor-
porate and non-corporate assets wifi receive equal rates of return at
every point in time.
What wifi this rate of return be? The answer depends on the technol-
ogy of adjustment. Under the q-theory of investment envisioned by
Tobin (1969) and developed by Hayashi (1982), Summers (1981), and
others, the surge in demand for non-corporate capital wifi temporarily12 Auerbach
increase the full cost of installed capital in that sector, driving up non-
corporate asset prices relative to replacement cost. This, in turn, wifi
reduce the asset-based return on non-corporate capitaland hence
corporate capital as wellbelow rduring the adjustment process.
We have, then, a pattern of incidence that must be characterized
not only in terms of rates of return to capital but also asset values. The
corporate tax introduced at date 1 wifi be borne partially by current
owners of corporate capital, through an initial drop in asset values,
and partially by future investors in corporate and non-corporate capi-
tal, through lower rates of return. The total burden borne by these
three groups as a whole wifi exceed the total burden of the tax because
initial owners of non-corporate capital will gain from an increase in as-
set values.8 The allocation of the burden among these groups will de-
pend on the adjustment technology. If adjustment is instantaneous,
Harberger's analysis applies, and the burden will fall entirely on future
capital owners. If adjustment occurs at a glacial pace, then virtually the
entire burden wifi be borne by existing corporate shareholders.
The distinction between changes in asset values and changes in asset
returns is important, even if all investors hold the same portfolio of
corporate and non-corporate assets, because the timing of incidence
differs. Whereas lower asset returns occur over time, changes in asset
values occur immediately. This distinction can be best understood in a
generational context. For older asset holders who have accumulated
capital and have short planning horizons, the change in asset values
wifi be most relevant. For younger individuals who have accumulated
little wealth but have longer planning horizons, the change in the rate
of return will matter more. Thus, we can think of the different compo-
nents of the corporate income tax burden in generational terms: a re-
duction in asset values that primarily hits the old, and a reduction in
rates of return that primarily hits the young.
The pattern of incidence would be different for an anticipated in-
crease in the corporate tax rate as adjustment would begin as soon as
the future tax increase became known, leading to a smaller initial de-
cline in corporate asset values and more of the burden being shifted to
new investors. Thus, prior announcement of a corporate tax increase
could be used to cushion the burden on existing asset owners, but if
one moves beyond a world of fixed factor supplies, it would affect eco-
nomic efficiency as well: tax-induced reductions in rates of return dis-
tort saving and investment decisions, while unexpected drops in asset
values do not.Who Bears the Corporate Tax? 13
A final caveat should be issued here regarding the distinction be-
tween share ownership and exposure to fluctuations in share prices.
With the growing use of stock options and other financial derivatives,
it has become easier and cheaper over time to hedge all or some risks
associated with stock price fluctuations. In theory, one could use de-
rivatives to hedge the risks of tax changes, shifting the burden onto
counterparties to the derivative transactions. While this is unlikely an
important issue at present, the pace of financial innovation suggests
that it may become one in the future.
Two important conclusions so far are that (1) it is misleading to allo-
cate the burden of a corporate tax increase to all capital, even if that re-
sult holds in the long run after capital has completely adjusted, and (2)
it is difficult to convey the incidence story in a one-dimensional break-
down of households, say, by wealth, income, or asset ownership; the
generational incidence pattern is extremely important as well.
6.Investment Provisions
The corporate income tax is not simply a uniform tax on economic in-
come originating in the corporate sector. The deviations in the tax base
from economic income, in turn, affect the incidence of the corporate tax
itself. One deviation relates to investment provisions. A second, dis-
cussed in the following section, involves the deductibffity of corporate
interest payments.
As modeled by Harberger, the base of the corporate income tax
equals income from all corporate capital. In particular, income from
capital goods of different vintages is taxed at the same rate. In reality,
capital goods of different ages receive different treatment, even though
they are subject to the same statutory corporate tax rate, because of
differences in depreciation provisions. This is true not only if the law
has changed over time (in which case different vintages would be
written off according to different schedules), but even if the law has
remained constant, for depreciation allowances do not track the actual
economic depreciation of assets. Given that an asset's income equals its
gross returns less depreciation, depreciation allowances that fall short
of economic depreciation lead to a tax base greater than income, and
allowances in excess of economic depreciation lead to a narrower tax
base.
Having depreciation allowances smaller or larger than economic de-












statutory corporate tax rate. But allowances that follow a different pat-
tern over time than economic depreciation can also induce differences
in the relative treatment of new and existing assets. This distinction is
ifiustrated in figure 1.3, which depicts various potential depreciation
schedules for an asset that decays at 10 percent per year. Economic
depreciation for such an asset would follow the declining-balance
method, starting with a 10 percent deduction in the first year of owner-
ship and following the pattern labeled "Economic." A proportionate re-
duction in each year's allowances would result in the pattern labeled
"Reduced." Following economic depreciation, but based on historic
cost rather than current cost, would lead instead to the pattern labeled
"Historic cost," starting at the same point as the original schedule but
falling faster as prices rise. An historic-cost schedule allowing faster
write-off, perhaps to compensate for the erosion of allowances due to
inflation,9 might look like the pattern labeled "Historic cost, acceler-
ated." Such a depreciation schedule is accelerated relative to economic
depreciation both by historic cost accounting and explicit acceleration.
With accelerated depreciation schedules, new assets are more attrac-
tive than old ones of the same productivity because they convey future
depreciation allowances that are higher in present value. Prior to 1986,
an additional distinction was provided by the investment taxcredit,
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tal already owned. The overall impact of such investment provisions
on the value of capital can be assessed using the expression:
Void = V(1 - k - rz, + tzold)
where V, is the value of a new unit of capital, V01d is the value of
an existing unit of equally productive capital, k is the investment tax
credit, -r is the corporate tax rate, is the present value of depre-
ciation allowances for the unit of new capital,1° and Vz0id is the pres-
ent value of depreciation allowances for the unit of existing capital. For
economic depreciation, k = 0 and z Zoid, so V01d = V. But typi-
cally Void < Calculations in my previous work (Auerbach 1983)
found that the ratio V0id/ fell to around 0.8 for corporate fixed cap-
ital after the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 due to the combination of
high inflation, accelerated depreciation, and the investment tax credit.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced this discount substantially by
lowering the corporate tax rate (which reduces the importance of dif-
ferences in depreciation allowances), and eliminating the investment
tax credit, with the drop in inflation over the same period working in
the same direction. In later work (Auerbach 1996), I estimated a com-
parable value for the mid-1990s of greater than 0.9.
What impact does this old-capital discount have on the incidence of
the corporate tax? The discount:
(V- V01d)/Vfl= k + r(z- Zoid) (1.2)
reflects the fact that old capital's tax base is broader than new capital's.
An increase in the corporate tax rate, therefore, increases the discount
by (z- Zoid) per each unit tax increase. This differential increase
represents a levy on existing capitala portion of future corporate
taxes that are immediately capitalized into the value of existing assets.
The incidence of this capitalized portion should be on existing share-
holders, with only the remaining future corporate taxes relevant for
the incidence analysis already carried out.1'
But recall that this previous analysis also called for a division of the
corporate income tax into components, with some future corporate tax
revenues capitalized into the value of existing corporate assets, and the
remaining revenues spread among future capital owners as envisioned
by the Harberger model. Thus, we now have layers of decomposition.
Because capital is slow to adjust, a portion of any corporate income tax
increase wifi be borne by existing shareholders. Of the remaining por-
tion, an additional piece will also be borne by shareholders, in the16 Auerbach
form of a "surcharge" on existing assets that does not affect the incen-
tives to accumulate capital within the corporate sector.
Using expression (1.2), one can also estimate the incidence of other
changes in the tax structure. For example, an increase in corporate
tax collections accomplished through a reduction in the generosity of
depreciation allowances (a reduction in z) or a reduction in the in-
vestment tax credit, k, will reduce the old-capital discount. Thus, the ef-
fective increase in the corporate tax on new capital wifi be higher than
is reflected in future corporate tax collections, for a portion of these col-
lections will go to provide a windfall to existing capital.
There have been few attempts in the literature to consider the
combined capitalization effects of corporate tax changes attributable
to gradual capital-stock adjustment and the distinction between old
and new capital. One example is my earlier estimate (Auerbach 1989)
of the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) on the value of
corporate equipment and structures. That analysis found that TRA86
increased corporate taxes at the margin of new investment, leading
to a small decline in the value of existing assets following the logic of
the previous section, but also provided substantial windfalls to existing
capital through the corporate tax rate reduction and investment tax
credit repeal. The net impact was a substantial increase in existing as-
set values, estimated at from 9 to 14 percent for equipment and from 4
to 14 percent for structures, with the results varying with assumptions
about the speed of capital stock adjustment and expectations regarding
the tax reform. Thus, changes that were estimated to have little net im-
pact on corporate tax revenues12 nevertheless could have significant
incidence effects, the result of a combined increased burden on new
capital and reduced burden on existing capital. These were predictions
based on theory, of course, although contemporaneous empirical evi-
dence provided some support (Cutler 1988).'
7.Corporate Financial Policy and Shareholder Taxes
As discussed above, one of Harberger's assumptions was that the
corporate tax rate was imposed as an increment, over and above the
individual tax rate that applied in both corporate and non-corporate
sectors. This would be a reasonable characterization of the situation in
the United States prior to 2003 if all corporate-source income were paid
out as dividends, for until 2003, dividends were taxed as ordinary in-
come after the corporate tax had been applied. But only a share of cor-Who Bears the Corporate Tax? 17
porate earnings are distributed as dividends, and only a share of the
returns to corporate capital accrues as corporate earningsa large por-
tion passes out of the corporation as interest payments on corporate
debt.
With corporations having the option to issue debt (the interest pay-
ments on which are deductible at the corporate level) and to retain
earnings (thereby trading off current dividends for capital gains on
which taxes may be lower and can be deferred), how much "double
taxation" does corporate capital actually face? In the extreme, if corpo-
rations finance all their investment by borrowing, there is no corporate
tax imposed on investment; indeed, corporate tax liabffity is reduced
because nominal interest paymentsa portion of which simply com-
pensates lenders for a loss in purchasing powerare tax deductible.
Corporate capital structures are not exclusively debt, of course, but
the presence of the debt-equity choice means that we must look more
closely at the reasons for equity finance. While some theories argue
simply that debt capacity is limited, and so that some corporate capital
must be subject to double taxation, other theories suggest that the
choice of equity capital indicates a tax preference for equity, i.e., that
the overall tax on equity income is lower than that on debt income, so
that the burden implied by debt finance represents an upper bound
for the burden on corporate capital. Because the tax imposed on debt
financewith single taxation to the recipientis similar to that on
non-corporate capital, these theories, in turn, suggest that corporate
capital may be favored by the tax system rather than being discri-
minated against. This implies, in turn, that the presence of the cor-
porate income tax may not discourage corporate activity but also
that increases in the corporate tax rate may simply be borne by share-
holders who, as a result, derive lower benefits from the corporate tax
structure.
Two such theories are those developed originally by Stiglitz (1973)
and Miller (1977). Stiglitz argued that equity would be used by firms
to finance only that portion of their value in excess of invested capital.
For example, an entrepreneur already in possession of patents or other
valuable intangible assets might be able to turn an investment of $1
million in plant and equipment into an enterprise worth $1.5 million.
If the entrepreneur incorporated, he or she would wish to finance the
$1 million investment using borrowed funds, so that the returns to cap-
ital could be sheltered from the corporate tax. But issuing any addi-
tional debt, up to the corporation's full value of $1.5 million, would18 Auerbach
require an immediate taxable distribution of funds to the owner!
entrepreneur.14 Thus, Stiglitz argued, corporate equity supported
intangible assets within the corporation that had been accumulated
without tax at either the corporate or individual level, and that would
remain free of tax as long as the corporation could avoid paying divi-
dends and the investor could avoid selling shares. Until then, only the
additional income on these assets would be taxable annually, at the
corporate level. Indeed, one can show that the decision of whether to
cash in immediately or maintain ownership of the intangible assets in
the form of equity depends only on whether the corporate tax rate is
higher or lower than the individual tax rate, assuming that the tax
treatment of the asset sale would be the same at different points in the
future'5 That is, the effective tax rate on this component of equity is
simply the corporate tax rate vthere is effectively no double taxation
of corporate equity that arises in this manner.
As it is empirically reasonable that the corporate tax rate wifi be less
than or equal to the ordinary tax rate,t,for well-to-do shareholders,
this theory suggests that corporate equity may bear no higher burden
than corporate debt, and hence that the corporate income tax imposes
no additional burden. Further, given the same assumptions about the
relationship between n andt,the entrepreneur would gain nothing
from eschewing the corporate form at the outset, for selling the intangi-
ble asset held in a non-corporate enterprise would still generate a tax
liabffity at the capital gains tax rate,tg,and the annual returns on the
asset held in non-corporate form would be taxed at ratet;the decision
of whether to incorporate or not depends, again, on whether r is lower
or higher thant.Thus, a small increase in r that maintains the inequal-
ity r <t,would be borne by the entrepreneur-shareholders, at least to
the extent that their original innovation activity was unaffected.
While interesting and influential in its impact on subsequent re-
search, Stiglitz's theory fails to characterize most of the equity in the
corporate sector. Recall that the theory predicts that debt wifi be used
to finance capital expenditures. Hence, corporate debt should equal
the corporate capital stock or, on a flow basis, borrowing should equal
capital expenditures. In fact, capital expenditures typically far exceed
borrowing. In 2004, for example, U.S. non-farm, non-financial corpora-
tions had $900 billion in capital expenditures and obtained $231 billion
through credit markets (Board of Governors 2005, Table F.102). What
can explain the remaining portion of equity? Here, the theory of Miller
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investors, arguing that, under a progressive tax system, there may be
some investors in a high enough tax bracket that the extra taxation at
the corporate level is more than offset by the preferential individual
tax treatment of equity income.
The after-tax return to equity holders from a dollar of pre-tax corpo-
rate returns is (1 -r) (1 - te),whereteis the effective individual tax
rate on equity income. The return to debt holders is (1 -tn).Hence,
even though there is double taxation of equity income, equity faces a
lower tax burden if:
(1 - r)(1 - t) > (1 - t) or tp - te > r(1 - te) (1.3)
That is, the taxes saved at the individual level exceed the net additional
corporate taxes. According to Miller's theory, investors with a tax pref-
erence for equity would hold equity, those with a tax preference for
debt would hold debt, and corporations would be indifferent between
the two, issuing enough of the two securities, in the aggregate, to sat-
isfy the demands of investors. Assuming that the equity tax rate is
some fraction of the ordinary tax rate, say,te= the decision to
hold equity, from the second equation in (1.3), becomes:
t(1)>r(1-2t) ortP>12)t (1.4)
Expression (1.4) implies that investors will sort by personal tax rate:
those with a personal tax rate below some critical level,t,wifi hold
only debt; those with a higher tax rate will hold only equity; and those
at that critical tax rate wifi be indifferent. If the corporation's before-tax
rate of return equals r, then it will pay equity holders r(1 -r)and debt-
holders r, reflecting the corporate-level tax differences. This sorting
equilibrium is shown in figure1.4.
Even with investor heterogeneity, is it plausible that a significant
share of investors wifi have a tax preference for equity, based on ex-
pression (1.3)? Currently, the U.S. top rates of tax on corporations and
individuals are35percent, so this would be impossible. Even before re-
cent tax cuts, the top individual rate in recent years has not been sub-
stantially higher than the corporate rate since before1981.Thus, a very
low effective equity tax rate would be required, and this seems incon-
sistent with the fact that a substantial share of equity earnings come to
investors as (until2003)fully taxed dividends. However, according to
the "new view" of dividend taxation (Auerbach1979,Bradford1981,
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capital gains rate (adjusted for deferrala very low rateeven if divi-
dends are distributed) when retained earnings are the source of equity
finance, as they are for most large corporations. Further, the relevant
corporate tax rate in expression (1.3) may be below the statutory rate if
corporations face limits on their abffity to deduct additional interest
payments, an issue that has been found to be relevant empirically in
various studies.16 Thus, through potentially low values of te and r, ex-
pression (1.3) may be satisfied for a number of investors, and it is these
investors' portion of shareholder wealth, not of the shareholder popu-
lation, that determines the extent of equity preference in the Miller
model.
The Miller model has interesting implications for the incidence of
the corporate tax. Because investors holding equity are taxed at a
lower rate than they would be holding debt, the corporate tax is a tax
shelterequity-holders would be worse off if corporate-source income
were treated just like non-corporate income. Thus, an increase in the
corporate tax rate wifi reduce the tax benefit from holding equity, but
unless the preference for equity over debt disappears, it will not affect
portfolio choice.
The dashed line in figure 1.4 illustrates the impact on equffibrium of
an increase in the corporate tax rate from r tot'.Investors with per-
sonal tax rate abovewifi continue to hold equity but will receive aWho Bears the Corporate Tax? 21
lower return for doing sothey bear the full brunt of the corporate tax
increase. Investors with tax rates between tand twill shift from eq-
uity to debt; doing so allows them to avoid a portion of the corporate
tax increase. Investors with a personal tax rate belowwifi not be af-
fected at all. Unlike in the Harberger model, there is nowhere for those
with tax rates aboveto go because equity is still their tax preferred
assetafter-tax returns on different assets are not equal for them.17
Thus, there is no shift out of corporate equity for investors with wealth
above tand, because debt is always an option, no need for capital to
shift out of the corporate sector, even for those investors with tax rates
between t and twho now choose not to hold corporate equity.18
According to the Miller model then, an increase in the corporate tax
is largely borne by shareholdersyet another way in which share-
holders may bear the corporate tax. But leaving aside whether
expression (1.3) is satisfied for an adequate portion of shareholder
wealth, there is another serious challenge to the Miller model
investors clearly do not specialize. A large share of the portfolios
of tax-exempt institutional investors takes the form of equity, and at
least some corporate bonds are held in the portfolios of higher-income
individuals
As discussed by Auerbach and King (1983), the Mifier model breaks
down when assets are risky and investors must balance the objectives
of diversification and tax minimization. High-bracket investors may
wish not to hold only equity, and low-bracket investors may wish
to hold a portion of their portfolio in higher-yielding risky assets such
as equity. Tax preferences will influence portfoliosthose in higher
brackets wifi stifi gravitate toward assets, like equity, with more favor-
able individual tax treatment. This modification of the model implies
that the incidence conclusions based on the simple Mifier model are
overly strong; while high-bracket investors suffer more from an in-
crease in the corporate tax because of their higher concentration in eq-
uity, even tax-exempt investors wifi bear some of the burden as well.
A second implication is that corporate bonds and non-corporate equity
are no longer perfect substitutes, tax considerations aside, so that
investors fleeing from corporate equity may need to look outside the
corporate sector for their investments.'9
Thus, the predictions of the Harberger model, that owners of corpo-
rate capital are hit initially by an increase in the corporate tax and that
this leads to a shift of capital outside the corporate sector, are partially
reestablished by modifying the Miller model to incorporate risk.22 Auerbach
7.1The Incidence of Corporate Integration Proposals
The previous discussion shows that having two levels of tax on
corporate-source income doesn't necessarily imply double taxation of
that income, in the sense of a cascade of corporate and individual rates.
The structure of corporate and individual taxation may allow some
investors to face marginal tax rates on corporate-source income that
are a little higher or even lower than their tax rates on ordinary in-
come. Just as having two levels of tax doesn't equate simply to double
taxation, reducing tax rates at one level doesn't translate simply into
marginal tax rate reductions.
Proposals for the "integration" of corporate and individual income
taxes typically do not involve full integration of the two taxes, in the
sense of treating C corporations like S corporations or partherships. As
mentioned above, this would be difficult, given the complexity of allo-
cating income to different classes of shareholders in the modem C
corporation. Rather, integration proposals and integration schemes
in practice elsewhere in the world generally involve reduced taxation
of dividends, reflecting the assumption that dividends face a higher
individual tax burden and that firms can choose to pay earnings as
dividends (or can be deemed to have done so) to qualify for the tax
benefit.2° What is the incidence of adopting such schemes, starting
from the current U.S. system?
A first observation is that schemes can be made roughly equivalent
regardless of whether they are imposed at the corporate or shareholder
level. For example, a dividends-paid deduction for the corporation
(also called a split-rate system) equates to a dividends-received credit
for corporate taxes paid (also called an imputation system) as long as
the latter is refundable to shareholders (such as tax-exempt investors)
whose tax liability is insufficient to cover the credit. Each of these
schemes, the standard approaches to integration in practice, amounts
to a reduction in the tax rate on dividends. This leads to a second ob-
servation: that the incidence of a corporate tax reduction depends on
the manner in which corporate taxes are reduced. Reducing the corpo-
rate tax rate and reducing the tax rate on corporate dividends are not
the same policy, even if the tax reductions are both implemented
through a reduction in corporate tax payments and have the same rev-
enue costs. Indeed, under the new view of equity taxation discussed
above, the dividend tax does not impose a marginal tax rate on new
corporate capital investment but is capitalized into the value of corpo-
rate shares. Thus, a reduction in that tax does not reduce the marginalWho Bears the Corporate Tax? 23
tax rate on corporate capital but simply increases the value of corpo-
rate shares.21 This highlights yet another possible way, in addition to
those already explored above, in which an increase in corporate taxa-
tion (in this instance, an increase in the rate of tax on dividends) would
be borne by existing shareholders rather than being spread to other
current and future owners of all capital.
8.Risk
Since the work of Domar and Musgrave (1944), economists have noted
that taxes on capital income provide insurance as well as imposing
burdens. Consider an arms-length asset-market investment that yields
a risky rate of return at rate r, which has an expected value greater
than the safe rate of return, i. We may decompose the return on the
risky asset into two components, the safe rate of return and the excess
return:
r=i+(ri) (1.5)
As has been established in the literature,22 a proportional tax sys-
tem that provides a full loss offset (that is, the same tax rate applies
whether income is positive or negative) imposes a burden on investors
only to the extent that the first component on the right-hand side of
equation (1.5), the risk-free return, is taxed. Put another way, for a hy-
pothetical tax system that imposes a tax rate t on the safe return and a
tax rate ton the excess return, leaving the investor with an after-tax
return of:
i(1_t)+(r_i)(1_t*) (1.6)
the investor is indifferent to the value of tk. The reason is that the inves-
tor can undo taxation of excess returns simply by holding more of the
risky asset and less of the safe asset.
This result, combined with the empirical observation that the real,
safe rate of return is very close to zero, led Gordon (1985) to suggest
that the corporate income tax imposes few economic distortions, al-
though it collects tax revenue on average (i.e., in expected value). One
could also express this argument as saying that the corporate tax has
little incidence to attribute because it imposes little burden. What of
the revenues the government collects? Under Gordon's view, the reve-
nues have positive expected value but have little market value to the
investors who forgo them because of their risk. If capital markets24 Auerbach
already spread risk efficiently, these revenues will be of no greater
value to the government than to taxpayers because any pooling that
could reduce aggregate risk would already have been done by the pri-
vate sector. Hence, under this argument, a uniform corporate tax is of
little consequence, and we need not devote much thought to concerns
about its distortions and its incidence.
This theory, however, must confront an obvious empirical contra-
diction. Since excess returns on the risky asset must sometimes be
negativeotherwise, the risky asset would dominate the safe asset
corporate tax revenues should sometimes be negative as well, even
if they are positive on average. There are basically three different
explanations for this contradiction, with different implications for tax
incidence.
The first explanation is that corporate earnings include more than a
normal safe rate of return and an excess return to risk-taking, i.e., eco-
nomic rents. If such rents are included in the corporate tax base, reve-
nue wifi be positive. The incidence and distortions associated with this
component of revenue depend on whether the rents respond to taxa-
tion. Pure economic rent in a competitive market wifi not respond, and
hence a tax on it would be borne by shareholders.
The second explanation is that the tax on excess returns isn't
symmetric, as characterized in expression (1.6). As the overall return
to capital equals gross returns less actual depreciation, a tax on excess
returns would include depreciation allowances that track actual de-
preciation. As depreciation allowances do not vary in this way, tax-
payers face a higher burden than expression (1.6) implies (Bulow and
Summers 1984). Also, the tax on excess returns should be negative
when excess returns are negative, but loss offsets are limited; this, too,
increases the prospective tax burden on investors. In both of these
cases, the corporate tax would impose a net burden on investors even
if the safe rate of return were zero, with corporate investment being
discouraged and incidence analysis once again relevant.
The third possible reason for corporate revenues being positive is
that private capital markets may not be fully efficient. If individual
investors do not fully pooi risks, then assets that are risky from the
investor's perspective, and hence yield excess returns, may not be as
risky from the government's perspective; only the risks common to all
assets would remain once the government pooled its revenue from the
assets. In this case, the revenue would have value to the government
but not to the taxpayers, and it could be positive in allaggregatestatesWho Bears the Corporate Tax? 25
of nature. Because the revenue, once pooled, could then be redistrib-
uted to taxpayers or spent by government, it ultimately would have
value to the population of taxpayers. hi this case, the corporate tax on
excess returns would have negative incidenceit would impose no ini-
tial burdens but would make at least some individuals better off. How-
ever, this potential explanation for persistently positive corporate tax
revenues would not seem particularly relevant given the very large
share of tax revenues attributable to extremely large companies, the
vast majority of which are easily traded on major stock exchanges.
In summary, the fact that corporate revenues are risky reduces the
burden of corporate taxation. Given that corporate tax revenues are al-
ways positive, though, the corporate tax cannot be seen simply as a
symmetric tax on excess returns. The necessary modification of theory
could mean higher burdens on shareholders; higher burdens on
capital-owners more generally; or, less plausibly, negative burdens,
depending on why corporate revenues are positive.
9.Imperfect Competition
We have evaluated the impact of a tax on the normal return to corpo-
rate capital and on the excess return to corporate capital that is attrib-
utable to risk. But are there other components of corporate profits with
which we must deal? The question of economic rents has already been
discussed above. Once one subtracts the normal return to capital pro-
viders and the return to risk, any profits that remain represent a rent
received by the corporation's owners. But this rent could come from
many sources, with different consequences for incidence.
Corporate rents could simply represent the earnings on ideas, as dis-
cussed above in relation to Stiglitz's (1973) theory. In this case, the cor-
poration tax might effectively be a tax on entrepreneurial labor, for it
would reduce the present value of the efforts that lead to the develop-
ment of intangible capital; that is, the garages of Sfficon Valley might
have been used to store cars if the corporate tax rate had been higher.
Corporate rents can also arise in a competitive model if there are
decreasing returns to scale in production. In this case, theory tells us
that a tax on rents imposes no distortions and is borne by shareholders.
Finally, corporate rents can arise from imperfect competition.litthe
simplest case of monopoly provision, the consequences are the same
a tax on corporate rent is not distortionary because a monopolist is
already maximizing before-tax rent and cannot do better once the tax26 Auerbach
is imposed. But under more complicated types of imperfect competi-
tion, before-tax rents due to imperfect competition could respond to
taxation.23
In an oft-cited empirical study, Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963)
examined the behavior of corporate taxes and corporate profits over
time and came to the startling conclusion that after-tax profits rose in
the short run in response to increases in the corporate tax rate: share-
holders actually benefited from corporate tax increases, even in the
short run! This conclusion necessarily points to imperfect competition
because theory under competitive markets predicts that a tax on corpo-
rate rents cannot be shifted at all, and (as discussed above in relation to
figure 1.2) a tax on corporate capital will only gradually be shifted over
time. The study's methodology does not allow one to identify the na-
ture of corporate responses, but presumably corporations in the world
of Krzyzaniak and Musgrave raise profits by restricting output and
increasing product prices, thereby passing the corporate tax on to the
consuming population.
The presence of imperfect competition would also influence the cor-
porate response to taxation of the normal return to capital. Noncompe-
titive rents occur in the first place because producers restrict output
below the competitive level. A further tax on one of these inputs, in
this case, capital, would lead to further restriction of output. Starting
from a point where output is already restricted, it is possible that pro-
ducers wifi over-shift in response to this tax as wellprices could rise
by more than the increase in costs.24 Thus, as corporations respond to
the increase in the corporate tax rate, there could be an even greater
shift of capital out of the corporate sector than the Harberger model
predicts, although this is not an unambiguous prediction. One thing is
sure, thougha tax on production in an industry in which output is
already restricted by imperfect competition wifi be more distortionary
than one in a competitive environment because it exacerbates an al-
ready existing distortion.
10.The Structure of Production
A key assumption of the Harberger model is that corporate and
non-corporate enterprises produce different commodities. This was
obviously a simplification given that Harberger divided industries
into corporate and non-corporate sectors based on each industry's
predominant, not universal, organizational form. As a logical matter,Who Bears the Corporate Tax? 27
though, having corporate and non-corporate producers of the same
commodities poses a problem for incidence analysis, for if produc-
tion methods and organizational form (for tax purposes) can be
chosen separately, then the corporate form wifi be adopted if and only
if its tax treatment is preferred. Thus, the coexistence of corporate
and non-corporate entities producing the same commodity requires
that either (1) organizational form and production techniques are
not independent, or (2) producers have access to different technolo-
gies, some of which benefit from corporate tax treatment and some
that achieve a lower tax burden outside the corporate sector.
Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989) model the corporatenon-corporate
distinction following the first of these approaches, assuming that incor-
poration facilitates operation on a larger scale, while non-corporate op-
eration facilitates the use of entrepreneurial ability. With a scarcity of
entrepreneurs, production will balance between the corporate and
non-corporate sectors at the point where the non-corporate advantage
provided by entrepreneurial abffity is just offset by the scale economies
provided by incorporation. In this model, and maintaining Harberger's
other major assumptions, the corporate income tax is still bad for capi-
tal, which is driven out of the corporate sector, but it is good for entre-
preneurs, whose services are in greater demand. The impact on labor is
uncertain, depending on relative substitution elasticities in corporate
and non-corporate production; if workers and entrepreneurs are suffi-
ciently complementary, the increased demand for entrepreneurs wifi
help workers as well.
Although they offer an explanation of the coexistence of corporate
and non-corporate firms in the same industry, Gravelle and Kotlik-
off do not test this explanation. Subsequent empirical analyses by Gor-
don and Mackie-Mason (1997) and Goolsbee (1998) find much smaller
implied, within-industiy responses to changes in the relative taxation
of corporate and non-corporate income, and hence much smaller
implied deadweight losses from differential taxation than Gravelle and
Kotlikoff report. These and other contributions to the literature also
emphasize, following the second approach listed above, why differ-
ences among firms (with respect to risk, for example) might lead some
to opt for corporate taxation and others to prefer taxation as non-
corporate entities. In one result of note, Gordon and Mackie-Mason
find that increases in the tax "price" of being in corporate form attract
firms with negative taxable income but deter firms with positive tax-
able income. This result also highlights the dynamic nature of the28 Auerbach
choice of organizational form. Although transition between corporate
and non-corporate form is far from costless, the availabifity of the two
forms may, over time, provide firms with a net tax benefit, even if one
form is usually preferred, by allowing them to switch when tax incen-
tives dictate. This is unlikely to be a realistic option at an annual fre-
quency, but it might be relevant over a firm's lifecycle and especially
in the transition from (usually loss-making) start-up to (usuallyprofit-
making) established company (Cullen and Gordon 2002).
While this more recent literature has made progress in understand-
ing the impact of taxes, particularly the corporate income tax, on the
choice of organizational form, and has provided estimates of the dead-
weight loss of this impact, there has been limited analysis of the impli-
cations for corporate tax incidence.
11.International Issues
In recent decades, the U.S. economy has experienced a steady increase
in the importance of international trade and capital flows. Between
1987 and 2003, the net stock of private U.S. fixed capital, valued at cur-
rent cost, rose from $10.71 trillion to $24.82trfflion,25 at an annual
growth rate of 5.4 percent. By comparison, U.S. privately owned assets
abroad, at current cost, rose over the same period from $1.39 trillion to
$7.37 trillion, at an annual growth rate of 11.0 percent, and foreign-
owned U.S. assets (excluding foreign official assets) rose from $1.44
trillion to $8.23 trillion, at an annual growth rate of 11.5 percent.26
The significance of the international investment channel has immedi-
ate implications for incidence analysis because capital fleeing the U.S.
corporate income tax now has an alternative potential destination that
is much bigger than the U.S. non-corporate sector and istherefore
much more able to absorb the capital without driving down the pre-
tax rate of return. Aside from the expanded size of the relevantcapital
market, however, considering the international capital market affects
corporate tax incidence analysis in three other important ways. First,
the corporate tax burden need not be borne fully by domestic residents
but can potentially be partially "exported" abroad. Second, there is an
added dimension of tax rules to analyze, governing how cross-border
flows are treated by different countries; one must know whether the
corporate tax is essentially source-based or residence-based, for ex-
ample. Finally, with other governments' tax systems involved, their
responses are relevant to analyzing the effects of U.S. taxchanges.Who Bears the Corporate Tax? 29
With capital mobile in a large world capital market, one's intuition
might be that capital owners should be more able to avoid the burden
of U.S. corporate taxation. But this intuition is misleading. As dis-
cussed by Bradford (1978) and Kotlikoff and Summers (1987), the total
burden on capital need not fall with the abffity of the United States to
affect the worldwide rate of return because, at the same time, the bur-
den of U.S. taxation is being spread over a larger total, worldwide cap-
ital stock. What does fall as the United States becomes small relative to
the world capital market is its ability to export the burden of a source-
based capital income tax, even if some capital is foreign owned. How
can this be so, if capital bears all of the tax? The answer, in this model,
is that the tax is also being borne by other domestic factors (in this case,
land), while comparable factors abroad gain.27
The tax treatment of cross-border flows adds considerable com-
plexity to the analysis of taxation and its effects, including incidence
analysis. Unlike in the purely domestic context, there is a distinction
between where income is earned and where its owner resides, and the
concept of residence itself is applied not only to individuals but also to
corporations. Countries may seek to tax corporate income on a source
basis, a residence basis, or some combination of the two, and most
countries follow this last approach, taxing at least some income at
source at the corporate level, even if the corporation is owned abroad,
and taxing at least some portfolio income of domestic residents on
holdings of foreign assets.
But the effects of a change in, say, the U.S. corporate tax rate cannot
even be considered without first characterizing the equilibrium that
might result in this very complex tax environment. As in the analysis
underlying the Miller model, an equilibrium with individuals possess-
ing different relative tax preferences for different assets leads to special-
ization of the highest-bracket investors in the most tax-favored assets
(Gordon 1986), but the number of possible allocations of assets among
investors is increased by the fact that individuals may hold foreign
assets in many countries and in a variety of ways (e.g., portfolio invest-
ment versus direct investment), and corporations (and, to a lesser ex-
tent, individuals) can change the location not only of their investments
but also of their tax residence. To this complexity of individual and
firm choices, one must add the strategic interactions of governments
in their choice of tax systems. A thorough discussion of the effects of
corporate taxation in this context is well beyond this paper's scope;
the reader is referred to the survey by Gordon and Hines (2002). But30 Auerbach
some important threads of the literature as it relates to incidence can
be highlighted.
11.1Residence Versus Source Taxation
Taxation of corporate capital income on a residence basis would seem
to leave less scope for shifting than taxation on a source basis. In the
former case, the U.S. tax rate would apply wherever the capital moved,
so it would be harder to avoid. But residence is not immutable, partic-
ularly for corporations. Thus, a residence-based corporate income tax
might induce less shifting of capital but more shifting of residence.28
It is also important to remember that the U.S. corporate income tax,
although sometimes referred to as being a residence-based tax, has
many features that cause it to resemble a source-based tax. First, by
allowing tax credits for foreign income taxes, the U.S. tax collects little
additional tax on foreign-source income of U.S. corporations. Second,
income of foreign subsidiaries is taxed only upon repatriation to the
United States. Thus, little foreign-source income is subject to tax, and
at low net tax rates.
11.2Tax Rate Versus Tax Base
As already discussed, changes in the corporate tax burden effected
through changes in the tax base, as through depreciation provisions,
have a different impact than equal-revenue changes in the corporate
tax rate because the two policies have different relative effects on old
and new capital. In the international context, there is an added reason
why these policies' effects would differthe ability of firms to locate
corporate income independently from corporate capital through the
mechanism of "transfer" pricing (or the prices assigned to transactions
between related parts of the firm located in different tax jurisdictions).
Variations in transfer prices can be used to shift income among juris-
dictions but are responsive to the tax rates on additional income, not
to investment-related provisions. Thus, transfer pricing reduces the rel-
ative efficiency of investment incentives. Simultaneous increases in the
corporate tax rate and investment incentives that hold constant the
marginal effective tax rate on new investment would no longer just im-
pose a capital levy on existing corporate assets but would be partially
shifted through behavioral responses.
The corporate tax rate could have similar effects even if shifts in cor-
porate income location were limited to actual changes in investment lo-
cation rather than to transfer pricing. If the use of capital in productionWho Bears the Corporate Tax? 31
in a given location is "lumpy" and does not obey the assumption of
constant returns to scale, then the investment decision also involves a
discrete location decision; the decision will be not simply one of plant
size in each location but also of where to locate the plants. Without
constant returns, there may be economic rents associated with the loca-
tion decision, and the tax on these rents wifi depend only on the cor-
porate tax rate. Thus, while the investment decision, conditional upon
location, may be analyzed as in the domestic context, the location deci-
sion wifi depend on the combined burden on capital and rents,
strengthening the impact of the corporate tax rate (Devereux and Grif-
fith 2003). In this context, corporate shareholders can shift not only a
tax on corporate capital but one on rents as well.
12.Managerial Issues
Economists stress that only individuals and not entities can bear tax
burdens. From this perspective, it is difficult to see the logic of a sepa-
rate tax on corporations. With no retreat from the position that only
individuals bear taxes, though, there may be something to the view of
the corporation as a separate entity to be taxed in the sense that corpo-
rate managers, as a group, may be affected by the corporate tax in
ways that differ from the effects of other taxes and may in turn have
an objective different than profit maximization.
This discussion wifi relate primarily to the corporate tax rate, rather
than to investment-related tax provisions, because the issues all con-
cern the extent to which behavior by corporate managers, holding in-
vestment fixed, affects the reported corporate tax base.
In one limited sense, the corporate income tax should have no im-
pact on the behavior of managers. As employee compensation is tax
deductible, it is stifi in the corporation's interest to pay employees,
including managers, their before-tax marginal products.29 But there
are other respects in which the existence of the corporate tax may affect
managerial behavior.30
First, the corporate income tax reduces the after-tax cost to share-
holders of managerial underperformance. Thus, to the extent that the
costs of monitoring and acquiring information about managerial per-
formance are not deductible from the corporate tax, the effect of the
tax may be to reduce efficiency in managerial performance. Even if
managers receive lower compensation as a resnit, the incidence of the
increased inefficiency is still to be considered; as with a decline in32 Auerbach
managerial input, the impact on capital and other factors would de-
pend on relative complementarities in the structure of production.
Second, tax compliance is largely a managerial decision, and a quite
substantive one given the great complexity of the corporate tax system.
It is customary to distinguish between (legal) tax avoidance and (ille-
gal) tax evasion, but the choices are better characterized as being along
a continuum of legal probability. In the standard model of individual
income tax evasion, the individual trades off tax savings from success-
ful evasion against the penalty if caught. The impact of an increase in
the tax rate depends on a number of factors, including the agent's risk
aversion and the penalty structure.3' In the corporate context, the situ-
ation is even less clear because it is difficult to know what motivates
managers to evade on behalf of shareholders.
The incidence of corporate tax evasion depends upon the "technol-
ogy" of tax evasion. Following Slemrod (2004), we can think of two
questions that affect the outcome: (1) is evasion general? Or (2) is it lim-
ited to a few managers? In the former case, evasion wifi reduce taxes
for all concerned and may reduce effective tax rates, driving down the
before-tax rate of return to capital; the effect would be like a corporate
tax cut, though one with a lesser reduction in deadweight loss because
of the resources wasted through evasion arrangements. In the latter
case, the taxes saved wifi not be eroded through a reduction in before-
tax returns, so the reduced burden wifi benefit the shareholders and
possibly managers. The second question involves the relationship be-
tween evasion and the scale of operations. If evasion is not part of the
"constant returns" technology, but rather more of an inframarginal
activity, then it resembles a lump-sum transfer to shareholders, even if
it is widely practiced. As in the discussion at various points above,
there is an important distinction here between the treatment of old
and new capital; in this case, the question is whether the "evasion tax
cut" extends to new capital.
But the corporate tax evasion game is different from the individ-
ual game in a very fundamental way because there are not just two
players, but (at least) three: the government, the manager, and the
shareholder. The manager decides not only what to report to the gov-
ernment but also what to report to the shareholder, and these decisions
are as distinct as tax accounting and financial accounting. This leads to
interesting interactions that have only recently been explored. As dis-
cussed by Desai and Dharmapala (2004), one needs to consider the
technology that governs the two processes of hiding resources fromWho Bears the Corporate Tax? 33
the government and hiding resources from shareholders. Quiteplausi-
bly, the two processes are complementary; in whichcase, managers
who are aggressive with respect to corporate tax evasionmay also en-
gage in large-scale diversion of shareholder resources. If this is true,
then the act of evasion may not actually benefit shareholders(even if
there are no competing evaders to reduce before-tax returns),and
strengthened corporate tax enforcement need not make shareholders
worse off.32
In summary, the corporate tax may affect managerial behaviorin
two ways: through the incentive effects of changes in after-tax payoffs,
and by giving rise to decisions regarding tax avoidance andevasion.
While some of the potential incidence effects have beenconsidered,
this is an area in which the literature is still developing.
13.Conclusions
Our journey beyond the Harberger model through themore recent lit-
erature takes us both forward and backward: forward in considering
issues not previously studied, but backward in reestablishing therele-
vance of the shareholder incidence approach. For a variety ofreasons,
shareholders may bear a certain portion of thecorporate tax burden.
They may be unable to shift taxes attributableto a discount on "old"
capital, taxes on rents, or taxes that simply reduce the advantagesof
corporate ownership. In the short run, they may also be unable to shift
taxes on corporate capital. Thus, the distribution of share ownership
remains empirically quite relevant to corporate tax incidence analysis,
though attributing ownership is itselfa challenging exercise.
Another of this paper's lessons is that one-dimensionalincidence
analysisdistributing the corporate tax burdenover a representative
cross-section of the populationcan be relatively uninformative about
who bears the corporate tax burden because it misses theelement
of timing. For example, for a tax that is shiftedover time from share-
holders to all owners of capital, as depicted in figure 1.2, thepart not
shifted wifi fall entirely on initial shareholders, while thepart that is
shifted wifi fall on future capital owners. Collapsing the burdenson
shareholders and capital owners into a singlecross section completely
misses this important distinction.
A related point is that it is more meaningful to analyzethe incidence
of corporate tax changes than of the corporate tax in itsentirety be-
cause (1) different components of the tax have different incidence (e.g.,Auerbach 34
a change in the corporate tax rate versus areduction in corporate tax
payments through a dividends-paiddeduction), and (2) incidence
relates to the path of the economy over time, notjust in a single year;
for example, it would make little sense to considerthe incidence of
one-year's depreciation deductions for a long-lived investment.
A further point is that corporate tax collectionsdon't equate to cor-
porate tax incidence, even in the aggregate. Awell-known reason for
this distinction is the deadweight loss of taxation,which makes bur-
dens exceed revenue collections. But burdens mayalso fall short of cor-
porate revenue collections if (1) distortions arereduced (as in the case
of improved risk-sharing) or (2) other taxes (e.g.personal taxes) are
avoided.
Finally, while exploring many extensions of theHarberger model, I
have devoted little attention to one of thatmodel's important omis-
sions: the impact of corporate income taxes oncapital accumulation.
But the implications are clear. For taxes oncapital income, in general,
we would expect an increasein the effective tax rate on new saving
and investment to reduce capital accumulation.The resulting decline
in the capital-labor ratio would increasebefore-tax returns to capital
and lead to a fall in wages, thus partially shifting the taxburden from
capital to labor. This analysis would apply to the corporatetax as well
but only to the extent that the corporate income taxrepresents a tax on
new saving and investment.The shift in the corporate tax burden from
capital to labor can proceed only if it is first shiftedfrom shareholders.
Notes
This paper was presented at the NBER's Tax Policy and theEconomy conference, held on
September 15,2005, in Washington. lam grateful to Jim Poterba,Mihir Desai, Dhaxnmika
Dharmapala, Joel Slemrod, and conference participants for comments onearlier drafts.
U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation (1986, Table 1). This approach washardly without
its critics. See, for example, Feldstein (1988), who alsotook issue with Pechman's meth-
odology and developed one particular way of allocating the corporatetax changes of
TRA86 based on the distribution of real capital income.
For further discussion, see McLure (1980) and Gordonand Wilson (1986).
The letters S and C stand for the corresponding subchaptersof Chapter 1 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.
An alternative to the S corporation that also provideslimited liability and pass-
through tax treatment is the limited liabffity company (LLC).LLCs offer more flexibffity
than S corporations in some dimensions, notably in not restrictingthe number of inves-
tors. They, too, have also grown in importance in recent years,although as of 2002, 5 cor-Who Bears the Corporate Tax? 35
porations accounted for considerably more net income ($183.5 billion) than did LLCs
($48.6 bfflion). See, respectively, Luttrell (2005, Figure C) and Wheeler and Parsons
(2004, Figure I).
This problem applies not only to these institutions' direct holdings ofcorporate equity
but also to their indirect holdings via mutual funds.
The 2005 PBGC takeover of some of United Airlines' pension plans isa recent
example.
See Bulow and Scholes (1983) for further discussion.
Indeed, one can consider additional groups of winners and losers from gradualadjust-
ment to changes in the corporate tax burden. For example, Goolsbee (2003) finds that
workers in industries that produce capital goods experiencean increase in wages in re-
sponse to tax-induced increases in investment demand.
This, indeed, was the approach taken by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which soughtto
provide depreciation allowances equal in present value to economic deprecationbut
based on historic cost.
The term is the present value of allowances per dollar of new capital.
Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) provide estimates of the impact of thisad-
justment on the generational incidence of taxation.
The 1986 act contained a number of other corporate tax provisions that accounted for
a projected overall increase in corporate tax revenues. See Auerbach and Slemrod (1997),
Table 1.
One can apply the same methodology to the most recent changes in capitalrecovery
provisions, the temporary "bonus depreciation" schemes of 2002 and 2003. Theprovi-
sions (described in more detail by Desai and Goolsbee 2004) provided immediatewrite-
off rather than depreciation for 30 percent (under the 2002 legislation)or 50 percent
(under the 2003 legislation) of qualifying investment purchases (equipment investment,
plus special-purpose structures with tax lifetimes of twentyyears or less); this accelerated
write-off acted like a small, temporary investment tax credit. The reduction in market
value due to the new-old capital distinction should have been approximately 1to 2 per-
cent of the affected capital stock, with a portion of this being offset by gradual adjustment
to the increased incentive to invest. The size of this latter effect depends not onlyon ad-
justment costs but also on expectations regarding the permanence of the provisions; but
under reasonable assumptions, the net overall impact predicted isa decline in value of
less than 1 percent of the affected capital stock.
The firm could, of course, invest additional borrowed funds in interest-bearing
assets, with no net tax impact, but this action would not representany change in the
value of its equity.
Cashing in immediately would yield (1- tg) for each dollar inside the firm, assum-
ing capital gains tax treatment at rate tg. If the assets remained in equity form, they
would accumulate at the rate r(1 - v), where r is the before-tax rate of return andr is the
corporate tax rate. Cashing in at some future date T would thus yielda net amount of
(1 + r(1 - r)) T(1 - tg), providing an annual return of r(1- r) per dollar of funds retained
as equity. Had the funds been withdrawn, they would have earned an annual return
r(1- ti,), where tis the ordinary individual tax rate.Auerbach 36
See Auerbach (2002) for further discussion.
This specialization highlights another requirement of theMiller model: that investors
not be able to hold unlimited short positions in eitherdebt or equity.
These conclusions, like those of the original Harberger model, arebased on the as-
sumption of fixed wealth. If corporate shareholders' wealthaccumulation declined in the
face of higher tax rates, this could drive up before-tax returns toall investors, partially
offsetting the initial impact of the corporate tax.
Some equity investors would also flee the corporate sectorif the Miller model were
extended to include an additional tax-favored asset, e.g., tax-exemptmunicipal debt. In
that case, investors in the very highest individual tax bracketswould choose to hold mu-
nicipal bonds, and an increase in the corporate tax ratewould make such bonds attrac-
tive to individuals near the equitymunicipal bond margin. Aswith a shift of investors
into the non-corporate sector, this would spread the incidenceof the tax increase to the
returns on other assets.
See Graetz and Warren (1998) for a detailed discussion of variousintegration mecha-
nisms developed in two studies during the early 1990s, oneby the U.S. Treasury and the
other by the American Law Institute.
Under the same theory, a reduction in the corporate tax ratewould lower the cost of
corporate capital.
For a good exposition of this and related results, see Kaplow(1994).
For one such analysis of tax incidence in this environmentthat takes the Harberger
model as its starting point, see Davidson and Martin (1985).
See the discussion in Auerbach and Hines (2003).
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov, FixedAsset Table 2.1, March 8,
2005).
Nguyen (2005), Table 2.
Gravelle and Smetters (2001) argue that these domestic U.S. factorswill bear little of
the corporate tax in the long run as a result of the large sizeof the United States and the
additional market power conveyed by imperfect substitutabilityof foreign and domestic
capital and commodities.
An example is the corporate "inversions" of recent years, whenU.S. companies relin-
quished "parent" status to foreign subsidiaries to become, for tax purposes,subsidiaries
of foreign corporations. See Desai and Hines (2002).
This does not hold exactly for stock options, which aredeductible only when exer-
cised rather than when granted, but the offsetting deferral ofindividual income tax
should roughly offset this delay.
There wifi also be ways in which the structure of corporateand shareholder taxes
may affect managerial decisions, for example,the decision whether to distribute earnings
in response to the taxation of dividends.
See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for further discussion.
See also Crocker and Slemrod (2005) on this topic.Who Bears the Corporate Tax? 37
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